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In this paper there were two types of international financial adjustment patterns identifi-
ed: type-A, where highly independent monetary policy and low domestic currency stability 
was the preferred path; and type-B, where monetary policy independence was given up 
and currency stability was acquired. We argue that whichever type of external financial 
adjustment the preferred  path may be, the ability to resist major external shocks simul-
taneously depend on a handful of other macro prudential factors (e.g. fiscal and debt  ser-
vice performance), too. A country may not be euro-zone member and still do well in the 
shock resistance department, like the Czech Republic. For Hungary, euro-zone membership 
would sure bring better shock resistance capabilities, yet, it would in no way offer solution 
to the existing deficits in its levels of international competitiveness and productivity.
1. Introduction
Beginning in the early 1990s, and following the huge run-ups in international financial flows 
up until the 2008-2009 crises, to what extent did the foreign-trade-sensitive small open eco-
nomies follow standard patterns in their external adjustment? That is our main question. Our 
concise answer is: the adjustment-patterns to be observed were not just very different in their 
profiles, but they also showed many variations with respect to the keys of their success. In this 
paper, we shall examine, however, whether how some central European small open economies, 
and Hungary in particular, could further increase their ability to resist external shocks. 
We shall demonstrate that, yes, when we compare the pre-crisis period of 1994-2007, with the 
post-crisis years, 2008-2014, overall, the small open economies, mostly trade-sensitive countries 
in our sample, could and did manage to improve their external shock-resistance capabilities.
During the most intensive phase of financial globalization, namely throughout the years of 
1994-2007, it was widely assumed that the proposition of the so called impossible trinity prin-
ciple was an iron law, the violation of which threatened with most heavy penalties, including a 
financial collapse, as a possible outcome.
The evidence that this paper provides, for most of the countries analyzed, is to support, that 
indeed, the power of the trinity proposition did prove to be very hard to go against. The simul-
taneous presence of three key factors, that of the foreign exchange price stability of the home 
currency; the preservation of the monetary independence of the home country’s central bank; 
and the maintenance of largely (or fully) open capital(financial) accounts; was hardly possible, 
no matter which country we put in the focus of statistical analysis. To test and thus to prove the 
power of the impossible trinity proposition we shall look at the so called trilemma indices for 
a group of 12 selected small open economies with a sharper focus on small European Union 
member countries.
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The observed “test period” chosen and applied for the comparison, will be almost two de-
cades long, namely we study the years of 1993-2014.
What we wish to examine more specifically is the relevance and strength of the trinity propositi-
on, especially when it comes to address the various patterns of external adjustments. We are posing 
one concrete main question: based on the trilemma indices, were there typical successful adjustment 
patterns to be identified from the appearing adjustment paths? Or, there were several types of patterns 
which could, in their own way, all be labelled as successful based on some unique criteria?
The approach applied for the analyses will be model-based and empirical when assessing the 
trilemma indices for the selected small open economies.
Although the impossible trinity proposition itself is not up to strict mathematical rigor, yet 
when it comes to produce good measurements, following the Aizenman (2010) and Aizenman 
et al (2013) methodology, one finds adequate parameters to proxy even if they do not properly 
match the designed simultaneous delivery of foreign exchange stability, monetary independen-
ce and open capital accounts. In essence, we want to confirm the claim that there are massive 
tradeoffs between simultaneous efforts to have any two policy options, i.e. to select any pair of 
the trilemma legs, without compromising the left-out third leg of the three adjustment channels. 
For instance, to have ongoing fx-stability and monetary independence at the same time, one 
should have strict capital account controls. In the absence of the latter – i.e. with floating rates 
and open capital accounts - one should allow for large fx-instability. The unavoidable result: 
countries with such policy options shall give up a good amount of their monetary independence 
to be able to offset the fx-instability consequences. 
As one of the most important findings of the paper, we wish to show that, in fact across the 
entire country sample, the capital-account openness became a generally shared attribute. This 
universally very liberal stance of treating current account transaction to help international capi-
tal flows more across national borders was accompanied with quite varied levels of fx-stability 
and those of monetary independence, respectively.
In the detailed analysis, we shall demonstrate that one could identify two major versions of 
external adjustment-policy paths. We have classified these two adjustment versions as type-A 
and type-B, respectively. Type-A is the “traditional” small open economy external adjustment 
profile in which monetary independence is preserved to a large degree, and where – given the 
open capital account – it is the fx-stability that plays the role of the primary shock absorber. 
Amongst the EU-members, Hungary and the Czech Republic represented this type-A policy 
choice, for example. The other typical option was to be identified with a guaranteed maintenance 
of fx-stability, and thus with the giving up of monetary policy independence. This was the pat-
tern always when we talked about a member of the euro-zone. Such typical euro-zone members-
hip patterns were followed by Austria, Slovenia, Slovakia, Portugal and Greece; and also to this 
group belongs, true somewhat as an outlier, Denmark, who, while keeping its own currency, the 
krone, was tightly matching/following the ECB monetary policy.
After the introduction, in section 2, we shall briefly review the relevant early theoretical fo-
undations, namely the Mundell-Fleming model. Next, we shall discuss its modern extensions. 
In section 3, we exhibit and comment on the behavior of the trilemma indices for both types of 
adjustment patterns covering the 1993-2014 period. The paper ends with a summary and conc-
lusion section.
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2. External Shocks for a Small Open Economy
2.1 Guidelines from Theory
Established analytical frameworks such as, Mundell (1968), Kenen (1989), Obstfeld (2015) as well as 
their empirically counterparts e.g. Aizenman (2010), have long emphasized the multiple dilemmas deri-
ving from the search for a single, optimal-policy-oriented model. The mentioned works have all especially 
pointed to the vulnerabilities caused by sudden and massive foreign capital inflows in the accumulation of 
excessive foreign debt and in moderating fx-instability. In this regard, there are a handful of general policy 
guidelines that older and current mainstream theories have put on the table for quite some time. 
A. Policy oriented models can show how monetary and fiscal policy must be used jointly with exchan-
ge rate changes to maintain internal and external balance. To obtain optimal policy combination by 
successive approximation each instrument should be assigned to the target on which it has the gre-
atest relative effect. We would therefore expect the foreign exchange rate to be used for adjustment 
of the external balance, and fiscal (tax and expenditure) policies to be used for internal balance.
B. We would add that in wide open economies, however, with large marginal propensity to 
import, the conventional assignment should be reversed! In addition, in these very open 
economies with flexible exchange rates, large and sudden changes in fiscal and monetary 
policy can cause explosive oscillations especially if policy changes are taking place wit-
hout allowing for the fx-rate effects to follow suit. In the crisis months of 2008-2009, for 
many small open economies this outcome has rapidly proven to be doing a lot of damage. 
C. With open and/or largely liberalized capital accounts central banks cannot choose indepen-
dently targets for both the money supply and the fx-rates. If they do, they immediately create 
conflicting adjustment paths for the economy and policy instruments work against each other 
and produce messy outcomes. This proposition is known as the impossible trinity as establis-
hed, by strict metrics, in Aizenman et al. (2013). In other words, to ease the trilemma, only 
relatively good pairs can be chosen from the policy toolbox, containing fx-stability, monetary 
independence and globally integrated capital accounts. Any two selected out of the mentioned 
three policy tools, automatically inhibits the application and proper use of the left-out third leg.
D. As a general rule, governments must almost always allow market forces to determine either 
the money supply or the fx-rate to find equilibrium levels. To swim against the stream for 
long could be very costly and can lead to financial exhaustion. In Hungary, this pattern was 
showing exceptionally strong vulnerability in her external finance. This proposition finally 
was understood in 2008, in the climax of the financial crisis, and with it the IMF loan ac-
cepted.1 Thus it showed how the hands of central banks action are tied when they need to 
choose between foreign exchange(fx)-stability and full monetary independence. The classi-
fication of small open economy trinity profiles are exhibited in Table 2 (as you can see later).
E. In an open economy with floating exchange rates, the induced reduction in the demand 
for net exports (shrinking foreign markets) further reduces the power of fiscal expansion 
to stimulate aggregate demand in the short run.  
F. In the context of current world economic trends for this year and for 2020, within reaso-
nable bounds, the depreciation of emerging-market currencies is a normal and welcome 
adjustment to the fact that emerging economies enjoy a relatively better economic out-
look than most OECD countries. 
1 See Benczes (2016).
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G. Appreciation means that some of the tightening in monetary conditions necessary in em-
erging-market economies will come from the exchange rate so that correspondingly less 
will be needed from domestic monetary policy.  Or so would the theoretical argument go.
H. The downside for emerging-markets and especially for small open economies is that, if 
the exchange rate moves by a large amount, it may lead to a rather uneven distribution of 
the adjustment burden with the exposed sectors, doing most of the adjustment and dom-
estic sectors (and asset markets) being allowed to expand strongly. If the exchange rate 
movement is seen as a short-lived overshooting, this could be an argument for temporary 
intervention to smooth the adjustment. But there is always a risk that this line of thinking 
may be exploited to justify intervention in cases where it does not really apply. Even whe-
re intervention may have some basis, its implementation is fraught with difficulties. 
I. There is broad convergence in empirical studies [as explained by Bohl et al. (2016)] on the find-
ing that foreign-exchange intervention is not effective beyond the very short term, except if it is 
not sterilized. That is to say that intervention works only if domestic monetary policy moves in 
the same desired direction of adjustment. In particular, a country that intervenes to stem curren-
cy appreciation would have to make its domestic monetary policy more accommodative, with 
the risk of adding to consumer and asset price pressures. An alternative option is to try to curb 
capital inflows through taxation, deposit requirements and other tools. Such measures may have 
an effect in the short term but eventually foreign investors usually find a way around them. Cont-
rols of this nature are blind: while they may stop some speculative inflows, they are also bound 
to hurt productive investment. They are more effective and have fewer unintended side-effects 
when they are targeted at avoiding too large inflows of “hot” money that can suddenly become an 
outflow and lead to financial sector problems. There is some empirical evidence - as was confir-
med by Rojas-Suarez (2015) - that capital controls can effectively shift the composition of inflows 
from short- to long-term investments. Even so, the first-best policy setting is not to target foreign 
capital inflows but to put in place regulatory and supervisory arrangements that make sure that 
the financial sector is resilient to funding shocks independently of their source. 
2.2 A Special Focus on Hungary 
Against these broad, yet sound theoretical guidelines we should mention that Hungary did, and 
does meet the very open, small economy with floating-fx-rate “trilemma-sensitive” criteria, and 
she has long, for almost two decades, been struggling with the right adjustment efforts to fund the 
twin-external and internal-deficits. Finding the optimal policy mix has never been easy, but in the 
world economic crisis environment that sent high shock waves, it was an extremely difficult assign-
ment. For a while, in the early 2000s, the picture for policy makers seemed to improve somewhat 
as capital inflows into Hungary in the mid-2000s have been boosted primarily by attractive real 
rates, and by the good prospects linked to EU- related structural reforms and to lower sovereign 
risk premia thanks to the initially good signs of macroeconomic stabilization.  Hungary attracted 
enough short- and medium-term capital by high real interest rates paid on government bonds (e.g., 
Benczes 2008). Furthermore, capital inflows tended to be associated with declining interest rates in 
the industrialized countries (compared to domestic interest rates) and with increased global liqui-
dity. The result was an appreciation of the HUF in real terms. Another complicating factor has been 
the rapid growth of bank credit to the private sector, funded by bank borrowing from abroad. These 
changes have not only been important in stimulating the capital inflows, but have also ill-shaped 
the policy responses to the severe complications caused especially by the seemingly cheap foreign 
funds. The latter delivered heavy blows to Hungarian macroeconomic and financial stability. 
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One of such lasting blows was the solution for long known Impossible Trinity dilemma: whi-
le opening the capital account and pursuing multiple policy objectives (price stability, external 
funds and competitiveness) policy tensions were likely to surface between domestic and foreign 
economic goals that were to be met simultaneously.  They did. In theory, greater exchange rate 
flexibility can help to resolve the tension between various policy targets by letting the appreciati-
on absorb the impact of the inflows. But in reality exchange rates could do little to make proper 
adjustments as emphasized by Bohl et al. (2016).  Indeed, lasting volatility (as can be seen on 
Graph 1) of fx-rates could not help stabilization policies in a trivial fashion. This was the case for 
most CEE-countries in general and for Hungary in particular.
While common global shocks have increasingly affected the volatility of interest rate spreads 
and other financial indicators in Hungary, important factors behind the turbulence were the 
unwanted domestic banking and fiscal developments. When the crisis intensified in late 2008, 
liquidity and capitalization strains in particular in the banking sector shook financial markets. 
The results in the financial account of the balance of payments for Hungary – a deficit of 7.8 
billion Euros in 2008, as compared to a surplus of 1.6 billion Euros in 2010 – show how soon 
and how drastically conditions tightened in the crisis hit international financial environment. In 
October of 2008 massive capital outflows, threatening by capital flight  led to interventions by the 
Hungarian Central Bank  (The National Bank of Hungary,  NBH),  and to an  immediate 350 ba-
sis points increase  in the  base rate. New and large sovereign borrowing became necessary, along 
with the support from the international financial institutions. (IMF, EBRD). These rescue steps 
did, to a large extent, add to spur interest rate volatility to new highs, as negative shocks took 
off from the further weakened government credibility.  In addition, special concerns about the 
long known cyclical effects of the recession in Western Europe continued to contribute to feed 
to the largely negative expectations about the unbalanced patterns in the Hungarian fiscal envi-
ronment. Following harsh fiscal measures taken by a new conservative right-wing government 
both fiscal and external financial stability has improved substantially. In the early years of 2010-
2014 there was a cost to be paid in terms of foregone economic growth. Later, growth has picked 
up substantially in the first quarter of 2018, thanks to the EU-cohesion funds flowing and still 
feeding investment-based growth, the stabilization policy overall can be labelled as successful.
2.3 Data and methodology
In the next section we review and identify shock resistance metrics and apply these to some 
selected small open economies. Next, we graphically exhibit the Trilemma indices for a handful 
of small open economies, for the 1993-2014 period and classify adjustment patterns.
The methodology of measuring the shock resistance capabilities has improved a great deal 
over the last decade. Primarily, we rely on the resistance indices as developed by Rojas-Suarez 
(2015). The index is composed of 7 components, as Table 1 summarizes, following Rojas-Suarez 
(2015) definitions, the external financial vulnerability variables are as follows.
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Table 1 External shock resistance variable 
Name of the component Variable Note
1        CA/GDP  in % X1 current account per GDP in per cent
2        Total debt/GDP in % X2 conditional
3        Short term debt/ reserves X3 traditional
4        Annual deficit/GDP % X4 traditional
5        Sovereign debt/GDP % X5 traditional
6        Error in  inflation targeting X6 relatively new variable
7        Change in financial vulnerability
          over credit cycles X7 this is a new variable
Source: Based on Rojas-Suarez (2015) the author’s exhibit
Out of the seven variables, X7 deserves some discussion since it is a clearly new measure of 
financial fragility, the so called FinFrag index.
The meaning of the new variable, X7:
  FinFrag = (dRCboom  - dRCt)  *  (dRCt  - dRCbust)                                    (1)
where dRCboom is the upper bound to the change in credit creation cycle, 
           dRCbust i is the lower bound in the credit creation cycle, respectively, 
as defined by Rojas-Suarez (2015, pp. 15-18). 
To create the composite index, then, we get it by taking the simple average of the 7 normali-
zed (X1, X2…. X7) variables. Normalization means that we take the difference between the sample 
average AVGX, and the value for the respective country index and then, we divide by standard 
deviation of the sample, σx1. For instance, the normalized variable for the ith country for X1 looks 
like this:
             X1i* =  ( X1i – AVGX1 ) /σx1                                                                        (2)
Then we create 
    SRIi = ( X1i* + X2i*+ X3i*+ X4i*+ X5i*+ X6i*+ X7i*)/7                                     (3)
If the increase in value of a variable does decrease the level of shock resistance, then, it gets 
multiplied by minus one (-1); the budget deficit/GDP is one such a variable for instance. The 
range of the shock resistance variable is spreading between -1.5 to +1.5, the first is the worst the 
latter is being the best level possible.
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Graph 1 The change in external shock resistance capabilities of some selected small open economies (2007-2014)
Source: Based on Rojas-Suarez (2015), the author’s exhibit
Graph 1 depicts the changes that took place in the shock resistance capabilities of a selected 
group of countries with small open economies.
To help the comparison, a middle size open economy, Poland – with good levels of resistance 
– and two non-European countries, Chile and South Korea, were added. These countries have 
all shown strong resistance capabilities. Out of the Central-Eastern-European (CEE) economies, 
it was clearly the Czech Republic that stood out with her sharply positive numbers in both 2007 
and in 2014. Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Hungary, on the other hand, proved to be very vulnerab-
le during the crisis years, they slipped lower than the minus one (-1) negative zone mark. From 
Graph 1 in sum, it can be stated that there was a great variety in the shock resistance capabilities 
of small open economies. However, in general, the lower government-debt, higher levels of cent-
ral bank reserves (like in South Korea, Chile, Czech Republic) could help a great deal to cushion 
shocks, and increase financial stability.
Based on the previous arguments, however, one is prompted to ask: do the particular trilem-
ma paths chosen determine the shock resistance levels? The answer to this question is a definite 
NO, it does not: there is no unambiguous economic policy success which can be clearly associa-
ted with just one particular trilemma solution pattern. But this proposition is by far not trivial. 
So, to further elaborate, in the next section we shall review the modern extensions of trilemma 
metrics.
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2.4 Recent Developments in the Measurability of 
the Impossible Trinity
How can the success or failure of external adjustments patterns, and more importantly, the 
trinity choices measured? 
This question, although in a somewhat different context, was asked well before the world eco-
nomic crises, by O’Neill (2001) for instance. External adjustment metrics on solid foundations 
were first produced by Aizenman et al. (2013). To our analysis, we adopt the variable definitions 
and database offered by the Aizenman et al. (2013). Out of the three components, fx-stability, 
monetary independence, and capital account openness, the monetary independence seems the 
easiest to measure. The suggested metrics is following the correlation between in home-country 
key interest rates and those of the base country money markets.
The expression below captures this relationship and transforms it into value between 0 and 1.
A/
                                                             (3)
The larger the value of this index the larger is the monetary independence in the given count-
ry. Base-countries are defined as the highest correlation pattern countries, typically key-curren-
cy countries, such as U.S., U.K., Australia and Germany. For a further and deeper discussion of 
the base-country choice, see Shambaugh (2004).
B/
On the fx-stability, the trilemma matrix offers this convenient solution to have values betwe-
en zero and 1: it takes the standard deviation of monetary fx rates stdev(exc_rate); and in absolute 
value |dlogEt/dt| of the end of December prices.
                                                                      (4)
Here too, higher values represent higher stability, and vice versa, lower values mean less stability.
C/
To create a binary variable for the capital account openness is the most difficult. Following 
a special methodology developed by Chinn-Ito (2008), we use the KAOPEN measures based 
on the IMF Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Restriction (AREAER). The 
variables are the following: 
                                       (5)
There are 4 types of capital controls:
k1: Multiple exchange rates (market and official, bureaucratic)
k2: Controls and limits on current account transactions
k3: Limits on capital account transaction
k4: Export-income-deposit requirements.
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In accordance with the other two trilemma indices, the capital account index, when it is hig-
hest, equals to one (1), and it means full openness and, when it is zero (0), it is the equivalent of 
a closed or totally isolated capital market. 
3. What do the trilemma indices show?
Table 2 Classification of some small open economies with respect to their Impossible Trinity profiles
















Foreign exchange stability NO YES
Monetary independence YES NO




Source: The author’s specification
We have identified two types of adjustment patterns: Type-A countries, which were keeping 
their monetary independence and the large fx-changes as shock absorbers; and Type-B count-
ries, which anchored themselves to a strong currency union, namely to the euro-zone and gave 
up monetary independence.
We start the analysis by type-A countries as listed in Table 2. The representative pattern of 
adjustment was characterized by the lack of fx-stability and by monetary independence, while 
keeping the capital account open. To this type-A-group belong Hungary, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Israel, Chile and South-Korea. 
We show the patterns of adjustment for one old (Denmark) and two newer CEE EU-member 
countries. One could detect quite a similar “trinity patterns” from Graph 2, Graph 3 and Graph 
4, respectively. 
Following 1999, the capital account was to be liberalized gradually in all of the three selected 
countries, to be completely open by 2005. The level of monetary independence was subject to va-
riations, yet for central banks the overall trend was more of a losing trend than gaining authority 
with respect to their powers of making proper external adjustments (remember the higher index 
numbers reflect higher independence).
Monetary independence in Hungary was highest in 2004, in the year of joining the EU, and 
was lowest in 2013. The fx-stability of the Hungarian forint (HUF) was losing steam rather than 
gaining strength. The Czech koruna, to a lesser extent, but headed the same weakening direction. 
The Danish krone, on the other hand, did show a remarkable level of stability. The main factors 
behind stability were the low levels of public debt, and the historically well balanced foreign tra-
de and financial flows with her main partners. 
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Graph 2 The evolution of trilemma indices in Hungary (1993-2014)
Source: Aizenman et al. (2013), IMF, AREAER (2015, 2016), the author’s exhibit
Graph 3 The evolution of trilemma indices in the Czech Republic (1993-2014)
Source: Aizenman et al. (2013), IMF, AREAER (2015, 2016), the author’s exhibit
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Graph 4 The evolution of trilemma indices in Denmark (1994-2014)   
Source: Aizenman et al. (2013), IMF, AREAER (2015, 2016), the author’s exhibit
To better understand the bigger volatility and the fx-policies used by the Hungarian and the 
Czech economies, we may look at another perspective of fx-adjustment, namely on the trade-
weighted, nominal effective profile of the HUF, CZK, respectively. 
The nominal effective exchange rate is determined as follows: the bilateral-trade weighted 
fx-rates are calculated as their geometric average (i.e. taking their multiples under the corres-
ponding root) as defined against a base year in an index form: when currency indices are greater 
than 100, it means strengthening, or appreciation; less than a 100 is equated with weakening, or 
depreciation. 
Graph 5 Nominal effective fx-rates Czech koruna, Danish krone and Hungarian forint (1994-2016, 2008 = 100)
Source: Based on BIS data base, the author’s exhibit
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As can be seen in Graph 5, when measured against the base-year 2008, from 1994 until 2000, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic showed opposite trends: the HUF was weakening; the CZK 
was strengthening vis-à-vis their main trading partners. Between 2000 and 2008 the koruna 
further strengthened. Following the 2008 crisis, up until today, the HUF has gone through furt-
her depreciation in the range of 10-15 per cent. In the post-crisis period, the Czech koruna also 
suffered from a weakening trend, although it was much lighter, 3-5 per cent on average. The 
Danish krone stability on the other hand was quite impressive.
An even more realistic picture can be depicted from Graph 6, which exhibits the so called 
real effective exchange rate trends for the two Eastern-European small open economies. The real 
effective rate index (REER) is the one that is adjusting the nominal rates for inflation thus giving 
a more realistic assessment of fx-rate changes. Up until the year 2000, both CEE economies wit-
nessed slight real appreciation of their currencies. Since then, this pattern changed and exhibited 
a more markedly weakening real trend. But in the post-crisis period up until 2017, there was 
visibly much more stability in the fx-adjustments for all three countries analyzed.
To explain this phenomenon, we should incorporate the notion of overshooting relative to 
the purchasing power parity levels, and the full impact of asset markets well beyond the price 
formation of just the goods markets. The asset markets go the opposite way after heavy fx-vola-
tility takes place. 
Graph 6 Real effective exchange rates, Hungarian forint and Czech koruna (1994-2016, 2008=100)
Source: Based on BIS data base, the author’s exhibit
In sum, we may conclude that the resilient floating regimes could help to a large extent resist 
external shocks but, of course, they could not compensate for long lasting problems of large fo-
reign indebtedness or those of international competitiveness. In countries where these historic 
problems did not exist, such as Denmark, well, there it was much easier an exercise to attain 
fx-stability.
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4. Summary and Conclusions 
For the main question of the paper, whether for the selected group of advanced small open 
economies there was, or was not a standard and universally prevalent external adjustment pat-
tern, the answer is a firm NO. The final conclusions of the study can be summarized as follows:
•	 Although	both	the	theoretical	and	practical	impossibility	of	the	trilemma	proposition	has	
been held up, that is, from the available economic policy toolbox the simultaneous appli-
cation of the fx-stability measures and the maintenance of monetary independence, with 
open capital accounts, was not and is just not possible; there were, and are even today, 
several alternative types of successful external adjustment paths that allow for currency 
stability and for the loss of monetary independence. 
•	 Thus	 the	 two	 clearly	 classifiable	patterns	 for	 this	 analysis	were	 the	 type-A	adjustment	
in which fx-volatility and monetary independence were dominant (e.g. Hungary, Czech 
Republic); and type-B in which fx-stability (practically a common currency, the euro) 
and the full giving-up of monetary independence, characterized the adjustment. Austria, 
Slovenia, Slovakia and Estonia were the strong small country representatives of such suc-
cessful adjustment. Denmark was a borderline case, keeping its own currency, the Danish 
krone, and its sovereign monetary authority.
•	 However	a	good	amount	of	caution	is	in	order	for	some	euro-zone	countries,	with	Por-
tugal and Greece in particular. Since in both of these euro-zone member countries the 
trilemma proposition simply did not and does not reveal all aspects of the shock resis-
tance difficulties arising. It is obviously the fiscal dimension of the adjustment that may 
soon further complicate the external shock resistance profile, and more importantly, the 
home country’s central bank capabilities to help growth and liquidity flow uninterrup-
tedly. Without the fiscal dimensions, however, there is no complete external adjustment 
picture.
•	 In	addition,	on	the	more	complex	question	whether	it	was	somehow	possible	to	identify	
which particular external adjustment pattern can be best labelled as truly and undoub-
tedly successful, we have not been able to arrive at a definitive conclusion. This is clearly 
a tougher academic assignment, which may only be addressed and thoroughly worked 
on only if some other key elements (such as the longer-term fiscal and international debt-
servicing profiles, the changes in the net international asset position, etc. of the country 
under scrutiny) are also incorporated. Limitations notwithstanding, one would, however, 
venture to claim that euro-zone membership itself - neither theoretically nor empirically 
-, even with the loss of monetary independence, does not represent a barrier to a good 
growth performance.
•	 Finally,	a	word	on	the	most	likely	balance	of	costs	and	benefits	of	a	foreseeable	Hunga-
rian euro-zone membership. The much recognized success of Slovakia, the Baltic states, 
and Slovenia suggest that there may not be any insurmountable obstacles in the way of 
keeping the requirements and still sustain economic growth. The benefits from a future 
stability and growth perspectives, may easily outweigh the costs. It must, of course, be 
added, however, that to overcome the currently existing problems in many dimensions of 
international competitiveness, whatever the power of the fx-regimes and monetary poli-
cy tools, maybe in Hungary there should be major and long lasting institutional measures 
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introduced. That is a must do in order for any government to be able withstand the new 
different types of competitive and financial external pressures evolving either from the 
re-shaped EU and world economy. External shock resistance capabilities even if largely 
improved, do not substitute for sources of longer run growth and competitiveness. For 
small open economies that lesson remains just as timely to be learned as ever.
At last, on the special Hungarian focus we may conclude that for a non-euro-zone small eco-
nomy, like Hungary, the external shocks meant more trouble and less defence abilities than for 
countries with larger domestic markets with a euro umbrella. 
The Hungarian economy in the crisis period was characterized by an unusually high external 
debt, wide current account deficit, and a large external financing requirement, still-excessive 
fiscal deficits, maturity and currency mismatches in the financial system, both within the indi-
vidual households as well as in the corporate sector. Hungary was too sensitive to movements 
in international capital markets since a considerable proportion of financing depended on flows 
from the western European parents to their Hungarian daughter-banks. In addition, foreign 
currency denominated loans accounted for a large portion of household and private sector credit 
as high domestic interest rates led them to take up credits in low interest currencies. As a result, 
both the household and the corporate sectors’ net foreign currency liabilities increased at the 
worst possible time, raising indirect risk to the banking system. One can safely conclude that one 
of the small open economy’s special vulnerabilities was that Hungary’s government debt was to 
a large extent foreign-owned. Since 2014 until today, this strain has been eased substantially by 
channelling new debt to domestic savers and to the corporate sector. In the year 2018, the lowe-
red budget deficit in GDP terms also helped stabilization policies a great deal removing obstacles 
from the road to a healthier and sustainable economic growth. 
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